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RECENT DECISIONS
It seems that the extraordinary economic emergency, that existed when the
law was passed, is not used by the court as a justification of its decision; the
cases of Wilson v. New, (fixing of wages and hours of railroad employees during a national emergency sustained) 243 U.S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L.Ed. 755
(1917) ; Block v. Hirsh, (fixing of rents during emergency in housing facilities
sustained) 256 U.S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L.Ed. 865 (1921) ; and Marcus Brown
Holding Co. v. Feldman, (same as Block case) 256 U.S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465, 65
L.Ed. 877 (1921) are not even cited in the opinion.
The court goes back to the majority opinion in Munn v. Illinois, supra; in that
case defendants enjoyed a virtual monopoly, but neither the enjoyment of a
monopoly nor of a franchise is held to be "the touchstone of public interest"
which justifies the regulation in the instant case. 78 L.Ed. 563, 575; cf. Brass v.
North Dakota, 153 U.S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct. 857, 38 L.Ed. 757 (1894) where price
regulation for grain elevators was sustained even though it was established that
the business was highly competitive. In rediscovering Munn v. Illinois, supra, the
court renounces the laissez-faire philosophy of the cases which had given so narrow a construction to the phrase, "affected with a public interest." As the law
now stands, a business is affected with a public interest, so as to be subject to
the exercise of the police power, when the legislature reasonably determines that
regulation is for the best interests of the people as a whole. And such regulation will not be considered as denying due process unless it is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to
adopt * * * " A definite tendency is indicated to hold all legislation, which is
passed in the interests of public welfare, valid unless the party assailing such
legislation can show it to be unreasonable and arbitrary. See Notes, 82 U. of Pa.
Law Rev. 619 (1934). Such a construction in effect adopts the economic philosophy and the approach to the due process clause of Mr. Justice Brandeis, as evidenced in his dissenting opinions in New State Ice Co. v. Liebinann, 285 U.S.
262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 76 L.Ed. 747 (1932) ; and Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517,
53 Sup. Ct. 481, 77 L.Ed. 929 (1933).
RPCHARD F. MOONEY.
PATENT RIGHTS-INJUNCTION IN PATENT CASES.-The city appeals from a
decree holding the appellee's patents covering processes and mechanisms appropriate for their practice, in purification of sewage valid and infringed by the
operation of the city's large sewage disposal plant. The decree granted an accounting and also an injunction restraining the city from operating its plant.
The patents had not as yet expired. Held, the decree is affirmed except as to
the injunction and as to it the decree is reversed. The City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., Fed. (C.C. A. 7th, 1934).
The right (franchise) which the patent grants to the inventor and his assigns is the right to exclude everyone from making, using or vending the invention patented. Bloonver v. McQuewan, et al, 14 How. 539, 549, 14 L.Ed. 532
(1852) ; U. S. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Pomeroy's Eq. Rem. 2nd Ed. § 565 (1919).
The inventor does not get from the law a right to a use he did not have before
but he gets the right to an exclusive use. United States v. United Shoe Machine
Co., 247 U.S. 32, 58, 62 L.Ed. 968 (1917). When the right has been legally established, the obvious means of protecting it is by an injunction. If no other remedy could be given than an action at law for damages, the inventor would be
ruined by the necessity of perpetual litigation. Story's Eq. Jur. § 931 (1877);
Allington & Curtis Mfg. Co., et al v. Booth, 78 Fed. 878 (C.C.A., 2d, 1897); §
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4921 R.S., U.S. Code Title 35 § 70. The remedy provided by an injunction exists
even if the infringer of the right has already been held liable in an action at
law for damages, provided the term of the right has not expired. Suffolk Co. v.
Hayden, 3 Wall. 315, 18 L.Ed. 76 (1865). The remedy at law is inadequate not
only because of the necessity of perpetual litigation but because money damages
are not adequate. To illustrate, an inventor was granted an injunction to restrain
the infringement of a patent which he did not use himself or had not licensed
others to use. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S.
405, 28 Sup. Ct. 748, 52 L.Ed. 1122 (1908). The language used in the case is
strong: "It hardly needs to be pointed out that the right can only retain its
attribute of exclusiveness by prevention of its violation. Anything but prevention
takes away the privilege which the law confers upon the patentee." Continental
Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 430, supra.
In the instant case the court appears to rely on the rule that injunctive relief
should be denied when it is not absolutely essential to preserve the rights of the
patentee, and would cause the infringer irreparable damage. This is mere lip
service to an established equity rule, the applicability of which to patent infringement cases is doubtful. The real ground for the decision is public policy. "If,
however, the injunction ordered by the trial court is made permanent in this
case, it would close the sewage plant, leaving the entire community without any
means for disposal of raw sewage other than running it into Lake Michigan,
thereby polluting its waters and endangering the health and lives of that and
other communities." The City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., supra.
Legally, the nature of the patent grant is such that its complete protection
lies in injunctive relief. But practically the grant is used as a source of profit
to the holder. He may seek money damages from infringers or he may attempt
to increase his own pecuniary returns by restricting competition. Sometimes he
may do both. An injunction besides its operating value in limiting competition
is also used as a lever to provide the holder with substantial and beneficial settlements. Congress acting upon the authority granted by the Constitution has
prescribed that such a procedure is the best means of promoting the Progress
of Science and Useful Arts. But, as indicated by the instant decision, the patentee cannot, in his attempt to enrich himself, endanger the public health. "The
right was not granted for the inventor's exclusive profit and advantage, the
benefit to the public or community at large was another and doubtless the primary object in granting and securing that right." Kendall v. Windsor, 21 How.
322, 328, 16 L.Ed. 165 (1858). The right has been limited in its application. For
instance, it cannot be expanded by placing limitations as to materials and supplies necessary to the operation of the invention. Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 37 Sup. Ct. 416, 61 L.Ed. 871 (1916).
Nor can it be used as a basis for abridging obligations as a public utility. Missouri ex rel. Baltinwre & Ohio Tel Co. v. Bell Tel. Co., 23 Fed. 539 (C.C. E.D.
Mo. 1885) ; appeal dismissed, 127 U.S. 780 (1887). Its use to restrain commerce
was condemned under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co.
v. Nuited States, 226 U.S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9, 57 L.Ed. 107 (1912). However, the
effect of these limitations is not to cut down the exclusive nature of the right
but merely to keep it within its originally predetermined scope. In England and
to some extent in Germany the exploitation of a patent may be directed by administrative order. The purpose is to protect the public from obnoxious restraint
of the beneficial use of the patent. To accomplish this end the administrative
order may extend even to revocation of the right. Freund Administrative Powers
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Over Persons and Property, § 205 (1928). The effect is to make the exclusive
nature of the right conditional. It is time that, in the United States, the public
as a whole be given an immediate right to share in the benefits to be derived
from the advance of science. To compel them to await the expiration of the
term of the grant or to subject themselves to a course of litigation in which
they face the risk that courts will adhere to the strict letter of the law and
enjoin the use rather than decide on the basis of the public interest (as the court
did in the instant case) is plainly unsocial.
GERRIT D. FosTER.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-MANIUFATURFR'S LiABiLiTY.-The defendant manufactured and sold a ladder to plaintiff's employer. A defective rung broke, causing
the plaintiff to fall thirty feet. The defect in the rung was not ascertainable by
ordinary inspection. The defendant made some tests of the wood and of the finished ladders. Experts testified that the defendant could have made tests which
might have led more readily to a discovery of the defect in the ladder. The defendant's witnesses showed that no such tests were applied in the ordinary manufacturing plant like that of the defendant. The trial court permitted the jury to
find that the defendant in the exercise of due care, should have applied the tests
suggested by the experts. A judgment was enterd on a verdict for the plaintiff.
Held, judgment affirmed, Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., (Cal. 1933) 28 P.
(2d) 29.
The instant case is in conformity with the trend of modern decisions extending the manufacturer's responsibility to others than the original purchaser. See
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Car Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). It
is frequently said that the general rule is that a manufacturer is not responsible
to persons other than the immediate purchasers, because there is no contractual
relationship between them. Kerwin v. Chippewa Shoe Mfg. Co., 163 Wis. 428,
157 N.W. 1101 (1916), Beznor v. Howell, 203 Wis. 1, 233 N.W. 758 (1932). But
the liability is held to extend to others than immediate purchasers when the defect is such as to render the article itself imminently dangerous, and serious injury to any person using it is a natural and probable consequence. Bright v. The
Barnett and Record Co., 88 Wis. 299, 60 N.W. 418 (1894). Although this holding
was ignored in Zieunan v. Kieckhefer Elev. Mfg. Co., 90 Wis. 97, 63 N.W. 1021
(1895), and in Miller v. Mead-Morrision Co., 166 Wis. 536, 166 N.W. 315 (1918).
Later Wisconsin cases have extended the responsibility by holding a manufacturer liable for injuries caused by negligent construction of articles which could
not be regarded as inherently dangerous even when negligently constructed.
Coakley v. Prentiss Wabers Stove Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928).
The more recent Wisconsin cases demand a higher degree of care than the
older cases. Recklessness and bad faith, or knowledge that the defective construction would result in the particular injury, was once necessary to recover
where there was no contractual relation. Zienzan v. Kieckhefer Elev. Mfg. Co.,
supra. The defendants were held to the standard of care required of other manufacturers in similar businesses and circumstances. Guinard v. Knapp-Stout &
Co., 95 Wis. 482, 70 N.W. 671 (1897). Now the degree of care is much higher. In
Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W.
392 (1932), the jury found the defendant negligent in not inspecting steel and
steel tubes by miscroscopic examinations. No other manufacturer required such
an examination of steel which was to be used in the manufacture of boiler tubes.
In cases like the instant case it is often difficult for the plaintiff to secure evi-

